The Delhi High Court’s decision to suspend the life sentence of former BJP MLA Kuldeep Singh Sengar in the Unnao rape case exposes serious gaps in how appellate courts are handling aggravated sexual offences and abuse-of-power crimes. By resting relief on a narrow, technical reading of who qualifies as a “public servant”, the order sidelines both the gravity of the offence and the documented pattern of intimidation and violence against the survivor’s family.
How the High Court
Reframed the Law
In its order, the High Court held that a sitting MLA does not
fall within the definition of “public servant” under section 21 of the Indian
Penal Code, which the POCSO Act adopts. On that basis, it ruled that section
5(c) of POCSO (aggravated penetrative sexual assault by a public servant) and
section 376(2) IPC (aggravated rape by a public servant) do not apply, and
therefore the life sentence under those aggravated provisions could not be
sustained.
Even if one accepts this textual reading for the sake of
argument, it does not erase Sengar’s criminal liability under other provisions.
He can still be convicted under section 4 of the POCSO Act for penetrative
sexual assault on a minor and under section 376 IPC for rape, both of which
independently permit life imprisonment.
A Case Built on Protest
and Judicial Pushback
The Unnao rape case is not a normal prosecution that casually
moved through the system.The FIR was registered only after sustained public
protests by the survivor, including the drastic step of attempting
self-immolation outside the Chief Minister’s residence.
Sengar’s arrest came in
2018 only after the Allahabad High Court intervened and noted that the
law-and-order machinery and government officials appeared to be acting in
concert with him and under his influence. After the incident, the survivor’s
family members were systematically targeted: her father was arrested on questionable
grounds, assaulted in custody, and later died, for which Sengar received a
ten-year sentence under section 304 Part II IPC in March 2020.
In 2019, a truck rammed into the car carrying the survivor and
her relatives to the trial court, leading the Supreme Court to transfer all
related cases from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi, even though a Delhi court later
rejected allegations of foul play in that crash. The trial court, in its
December 2019 judgment convicting and sentencing Sengar, specifically recorded
that the survivor was threatened into silence and her family systematically
targeted to shut down the case.
What the Law Says on Suspending Life Sentences
Indian law
draws a clear line between suspending fixed-term sentences and suspending life
sentences. For limited-term sentences, suspension during appeal is common; for
life imprisonment, it is meant to be exceptional.
The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that once a person is convicted and sentenced to
life, the presumption of innocence no longer survives in the same way, and
appellate courts must be extremely cautious in granting suspension. In cases
like Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, the Court has emphasised that a
life convict must point to a glaring, prima facie error in the trial court’s
judgment—one strong enough that, by itself, it could realistically justify
acquittal on appeal.
By that standard, the non-applicability of
section 5(c) POCSO, even if assumed, is not enough.The conviction and potential
for life imprisonment under section 4 POCSO and section 376 IPC still stand,
which means the legal foundation for the sentence remains largely intact.
The High Court’s Omission: Gravity and Risk
The core
flaw in the High Court’s approach is that it treats the matter like a routine
appeal focused on one technical issue. It does not seriously engage with
whether there is a strong prima facie case for conviction under section 4 POCSO
and section 376 IPC, even though those provisions are sufficient to sustain a
life sentence.
Worse, the
court appears to reason that because Sengar has already undergone at least the
minimum seven-year term under section 4 POCSO, he can still be given relief,
effectively ignoring that the same provision also authorises life imprisonment
for such offences. This reading dilutes the legislature’s clear intent to treat
penetrative sexual assault on a minor with the highest level of seriousness.
On the question of victim safety, the record
itself shows a history of threats and violence directed at the survivor’s family—her
father’s death, attempts to silence witnesses, and the extraordinary security
measures once considered necessary during trial. Yet these circumstances are
brushed aside on the assumption that the police will do their job, an
assumption that sits uneasily with the very history of state machinery being
bent to protect the accused in this case.